Abstract: Postcolonial critique instructed anthropologists to turn to history in order to integrate time into their discourse. Yethistoriography, even when undertaken from apostcolonial, subaltern standpoint,has foundered preciselyonthe challengeofdoing justicetoreligious subjectivity.How then is the non-religious scholart og ain access to religious phenomena?P henomenological understandingso fb ody, temporality and place provide an alternative account of what it means to come to understand something.Seen from this perspective,disciplines such as anthropologyinfactrelyradicallyontime, on the capacity of the scholar'sb odyt os lowlye ffect an ew synthesiso fb ody, place and people. In the expansion thatt akes place lies the potential to come to understand, without any necessary involvement of consent or belief, the continuum between religious and non-religious experience.
tion anetwork of assumptions about what it is to be human, alive or dead, what it is to worship, what it is to be divine. Instead, we re-absorb spirit possession into the languageo fc onsciousness ('altered' states of consciousness,b ut consciousnessnevertheless),orinto the languageofbiology(measuringbrain activity alterations to see if anything 'real' is happening). More frequentlystillwesimplyd ismiss it as falsehood.
We mayn ot be able to step outside our owne pistemologies, because they are in fact our ontologies. We apprehend the world not just cognitively but emotionally,a ffectively, and practically. Or -we could allow ourselvest ob eu nsettled. My book titled Fertile Disorder.S pirit Possessiona nd its Provocation of the Modern (Ram2 013) tries to persuade readerst oc ome on aj ourney with me, through dense ethnographic exploration of what possession means for different women, in order to return to more common scholarlya nd political preoccupations, newlye nriched by new hypothesesa nd ways of re-imagining at least some of our assumptions. In the book Ideal with an umber of such preoccupations such as gender,agency,the body, emotions, as well as justice. HereIwant to see if we can extend some of thosemethodsand insights to the themesofreligion, changeand history which are the binding themes of this volume. Foritis not simply extreme phenomena such as spirit possessionthatact as a 'provocation of the modern'.S omething of that provocation seems to cling to all of religion as farasself-consciouslymodern projects are concerned -whether these be political projects such as feminism, liberalism and socialism -or models of knowledge that take the methodso fs cience as theiry ardstick of truth. Religion does not have to do much to be constituted as aprovocation. Itsvery visibilityto non-religious others seems an eruption into ap lace (the public sphere) and a time (the present) to which it does not belong.What does this reveal of our understandingoft ime itself?W hat understanding of time and of as hared present underlies this responseo fs urprise and discomfort at every manifestation of religion?I tisnot onlythat religion is being located in the past,itisalso being assumed that the past does not simplyflow into the present.Instead, the present is assumedt oe ntirely supersede the past.H ow might we think differentlya bout the relation between past and present such that even those who do not share the assumptions of ar eligious phenomenon might nevertheless aspire to gain af orm of access to it?
In what follows It ake up two bodies of work thath elp us think differently about time.
First,Iturn to the highlyp oliticized set of discourses bequeathed to us by forty years of questions and critiques raised by feminists, post-structuralists, and post-colonial scholars. All of these coalescei no ne respect: they have all, in some form or another,interrogated the linear, progressivist self-imageofmod-ernity.Inturnthey share elements of an alternative model of history and of time. We may, after Foucault,d escribe this model as an archaeology of the present.
The second bodyofwork Iturn to is the discipline of anthropology.This sits oddlyafter turning to the political critiquesf or inspiration. Forp ostcolonial critiques in particularh avet ended to see anthropology as singularlylacking in an adequate sense of time. Anthropological traditions have been stronglyi ndicted for failingt oi ncorporate the time of colonial rule into their accounts of what they see and describe as 'tribal' societies for example (Asad 1975,1 03 -120) . The explicit models of time anthropologists have offered for the non-western societies they have studied -as non-linear,c yclical time in India for examplemight be seen from ap ost-colonial perspective as too homogenizing (Sarkar 2002,1 5) , and as adding to a 'time distance' between the western 'us' and 'them' (Fabian 1983) .
In taking such chargestoheart,social changebecame acentral motif for anthropology.I nm yb ook (Ram2 013) Ic loselye xamine the manyw aysi nw hich spirit possession has been positioned as an index or concrete expression of the tensions introduced by capitalism into ap re-capitalist culture. In some cases, as in the factories of Malaysia (Ong 1987) , the arrival or consolidation of capitalismt akes the form of new relations of production and new disciplines of work. Others follow the lead of Taussig (1997) in describing cultso fs pirit queens as mimetic amplifications of different qualities of the modern state (Morris 2000; Tsing 1993 ). My ownwork in rural India began in the 1980s directlyconcerned with questions of social change, exploring the changingn ature of the sexual division of labor with the adoption of new technology and capitalist relations of production. Iwent on to research the involvement of women in projects of social reform and development,a nd the changingc onditions under which women 'came of age',g aveb irth and mothered. But the enigmatic qualities of spirit possession made me dissatisfied with extendingt his kind of analysis to every aspect of phenomena we encounter in the world. In this case it meant ignoring the very features which werem ost spectacular not onlyt om e, but to those around me in Tamil Nadu. What stood out for all of us was the radical changei nt he very people who were 'entered' by spirits. During such intervals, their behavior, gait and languagew ould alter.I nt he shrines of Catholic saints wherep eople went to seek relief from the troublesome spirits, the Catholic deities did battle with the demonic. In Tamil Nadu,the Christian powers shared certain characteristics of the demonicworld. Like them, they too entered the bodies of humans,t aking them as mediums in such confrontations. It is true that one cannot simplyr emainw ith the sensory and the spectacular moment even in order to explore the meaningso fs uch moments. Those meaningst urned out to be distributed across the interrelationship between diverse sets of practices -some wereritual practices that took place in templesand in Christian shrines, others wereconstructions of gendered life cycles, yetothers wereconcernedwith death and its effectso nt he flow of life energies. The changes Ic ame to explore werem ore personal, as possession brought changes to the livesn ot onlyo ft he person directlyi nvolved, but of all who weret ouched by it.
In what follows Ifirst trace the kind of alternativespostcolonial and feminist critiquesforgedinrelation to what Ballard critically describes as the 'preceptsor conventions of asingular historical consciousness,which is thatofmodern, professional, Western, or now global historicity' (Ballard 2014,102) . Thissingular historical consciousness, argues Ballard, is particularlyr esistant to religion, for it could be said to have 'cut its teeth' on questioning the authenticity of the events described in the Bible (Ballard2014, 102).Ithen trace some of the difficulties experienced in attempts by postcolonial historians to pluralize thosec onventions in relation to religion when writing the history of modern India. FinallyIturn to phenomenologyand anthropology,arguing that thereare other ways of understanding temporality and change. My aim here is not to elevatea nthropological practice but rather to elicit ad imension that can be applied morew idely. Through what version of practice, through what version of time and of change, might non-religious scholars gain access to religious experiences?
1R eligion and the archaeological approach to the time of modernity
In an openingchapter of Fertile Disorder Iadopt am ode of historical analysis.I explore how it is thatspirit possessionand manyofits attendant practices have come to be so absent from the dominant discourses of modernIndia (Ram2013, 42 -70) . Itrace the particularworkings of Reason in Indian modernity,specifically in the regional modernity of Tamil Nadu, wherer ationalityw as the chosen weapon of twentieth century intellectuals engaged in disputing the power of Brahmanic culture. It race how 'possession',a ne minent candidate for cultural iconicity as anon-Brahmanic complex of practices,came instead to be marginalized. It has become apractice lacking adiscourse of its own within the dominant episteme. The ensemble of practices within which 'possession' livesh as been carved up by different disciplines to constituted istinctiveo bjects of knowledge. The stories of the local goddess who afflicts and cures people appeari nc ollections of local folk tales. The performances of her epics are represented in performance studies. The wider practicesofcuring and the diagnoses of misfortune are assigned to anthropology,b ut are distributed across an umber of sub-disci-plines, from studies of folk religion to medicala nthropology.Ithus attempt to show that the term 'possession',seemingly unitary,isinfact a 'remainder':something left over after apreviouslycoherent setofp ractices has been thus distributed. What possession can no longer claim in these dominant discourses is the capacity to generate knowledge in its own right. But is this history writing in the usual sense of the term?Itdeparts in certain crucial ways from an objectivist version of history,one in which the preoccupations of the enquirer are supposed to playnopart in the account she producesof the past.Quite the opposite is the case here. The story Ipiece together is situated by my concerns with the politics of the present in India. It is ar esponse Is hare with many of my intellectual peers to acrisis in asecularism we took for granted in 'Nehruvian' post-independence India. Such an upbringingi nu pper-caste urban Hindu India allowed one to bask in the assumption that one livedi na place whereaunique Indian modernity has successfullyi ntegrated the best of Indian traditions -this included the best of Hinduism -imbibed as pure spirituality,culled of the taint of caste which was assumedtobeonits wayout.This version co-existed comfortablyenough with an official secularism -until as ustained challenget os ecularism came from the direction of as trident and exclusivist Hindu nationalism.
There have been different kinds of intellectual responses to this challenge, some of them seeking possible alternative models from different strands of religion itself.Nandyisaleading advocate for such aposition. He finds in 'everyday' Hinduism afluidity that lends itself to cutting across the formalities of religious borders.The flexible niche thatallows one to adopt adeity as apersonal object of devotion has meant for example that Muslim musicians could quiteu nselfconsciouslychoose Saraswati, goddess of learning and the arts, as their presiding deity (Nandy2001). Amore widespread responseamong secular intellectuals has been to invoke the medieval bhaktitraditions of Hinduism as an alternative model of religion. At its boldest,bhakti called on worshippers to bypass the mediation of religious institutions and orthodoxies, replacing them with at eacher who could show youthe waytofind the divine within oneself. Bhakti models of religion also provided the kind of shared languagea nd basic understandings Nandyi nvokes,p roviding ah abitus which easilyc rossed between Hinduism and Sufi strands of Islam. As the work of Eaton (Eaton 1985) demonstrates, the largest populations of Muslims were in undivided Punjab and Bengal, well away from the historic heartlands of Islamic states.Itwas not the state, but rather astate-supportedpopular Sufism,that broughtthese communities into Islam, mediated by Sufis who involved themselvesn ot onlyinworship but in practical help, healing and adjudicatingoverdisputes.Such 'conversion' sat lightlyonexisting norms and practices,n ot requiringt otal transformation of as hared past.
My concern has been that these debates on religion and secularism continue to leave out whole segmentso fe xperience of people for whom gods are even more spectacularlya ccessible to devotees than in bhakti traditions. Moreover these are gods who curea sw ell as afflict.I n1 995,the German scholar Günther D. Sontheimer,who adopted some of the insights and methods of the imaginative Indian Marxist intellectual Damodar D. Kosambi, argued thatm odernity has made matters worse for what he called the folk and tribalm odels of religion that historicallycontributed much to Hinduism. In the new Hinduism of the middle class, he concludes, 'bhakti and the philosophical contents of Hinduism' have come to stand for the entirety.There remains,i nh is view, 'not even ad isapproving awareness of folk Hinduism' (Sontheimer 1995) .
Such oblivion is part of am uch more secure hegemonyo ft he upper caste/ classes and Ihavet herefore seen it as an urgent task of the present to acknowledge the continued vitality of non-elite religion. An excavation of the past undertaken in this spirit makes no presumption of being detached from the subjectivity of the enquirer.Then again, it is not 'subjective' in the usual sense of referring to the consciousness of an isolated individual subject.Rather,these are responses to shared concerns, comingout of varied but shared projects (secularism, democracy,socialism etc.), and part of wider shared debates.Itisanattempt to see how our subjectivities came to be constituted in certain ways.This referencetoa shared constitution of subjectivity does not entail an assumption that we are somehow identical. Rather,the past operates in the mannerofashared archive out of which we can selectively take and adapt accordingt ot he needsa nd purposes of the present.
Such are-workingofhistory came into postcolonial studies through the work of Foucault.A sh ed escribes it in his Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1972) , an archive is both embodied in specific enunciations, statements,a sw ell as forming the precondition for thoses tatements.
The archive is first the lawofwhatcan be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events. But the archive is also that which determines that all these things said do not accumulatee ndlesslyi na na morphous mass, nor are they inscribed in an unbrokenlinearity,nor do they disappear at the mercy of chanceexternal accidents; but they areg rouped together in distinct figures,c omposed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurredi na ccordance with specific regularities… (Foucault1 972, 129).
It is this version of temporality -as ad ominant genealogyt ob ee xcavatedwhich has fed into manyo ft he critical discourseso ft he past forty years, not onlypost-structuralism and postcolonial critique, but various strandsoffeminist critique as well. Thus Saidutilizes Foucault'snotion of the archive in Orientalism But if an archive is actually constitutive of who we are as speaking subjects, then how is one to perform an 'archaeology'?F oucault'sa nswer in this text is that one should explore discourses thath ave 'justc eased to be ours',t hat is, whereacertain historical threshold has been crossed. That threshold,f or India, is preciselyt he crossingo facertain normativity assigned to discourses of secularism. Othersh avee xploited other forms of dissonance. Said exploits the pain and dissonance he experienceda sapostcolonial subject, at once part and not part of ap rivileged location in the North Americana cademy (Said 1979) . Feminist intellectuals have used the frustration and pain of having to inhabit aworld where it is apparentlyimpossibletobeawoman and an intellectualatonce. What is shared across these different situations is the capacity to make generative adissonance that is at once individuallylived and socially produced.
Takent ogether, we now have forty years of cumulative insights into the exclusions that have been constitutive of modernity.Religion is one of those casualties. 'The Moderns have never been modern',saysLatour (Latour 2013,14) . And indeed, this is the spirit of my critique as well, ultimately. But first it must be said, as Latour goes on to immediately acknowledge,that the moderns have nevertheless 'believed they were modern, and this belief too is crucial, for it has made them act in athousand contradictory ways' (Latour 2013,14) . These 'thousand contradictory ways' can stillcohereenough to exclude and marginalize sociallyc onstituted groups and social phenomena in quite systematic ways.I fw e look back over the different kinds of exclusions and marginalizations that have been enumerated as constitutive of modernity,w es ee an overlappings eries emerging.I ne ach of these oppositions, religion is pre-framed -each time to its own disadvantage.D ependingo nt he context,c ontemporary utterancesc an frame modernity as capitalism versus feudalism,a sp rogress versus tradition, as reason versus irrationality, or science versus superstition, as changev ersus stagnation, as democracy versus authoritarian absolutism, or indeed, as order and hygiene versus disorder and infection. None of these are simple oppositions. In each case, one term plays an inferior role. In each case, however,religion can take on the coloringofany or all the inferior terms,depending on the context: as stagnant,a uthoritarian, feudal, superstitious, corrupt,a nd the sourceo fu nhygienic unscientific practices.
What makesthese understandings 'stick' is that none of these have operated as purelyc onceptual oppositions. They have all been realized in projects of power and intervention that are alsointertwined. As feministshavelong pointed out,s uch polaritiesc ome to us alreadys haped by hierarchies of power that divide the territory as well as privilegeone term over another: objectivity over subjectivity,r ationality over other forms of comprehension, the Man of Reason (Lloyd1 985) over the feminized submergedc ontinent of the psyche. Each of these antinomies acts as an affective drive for the institution of aproject.Representing the psyche as unknown and dark has been the pretext for Men of Enlightenment to map and bring the psyche to light,mediated by women'sbodies as bearers of hysterical symptoms (Koffman 1985) . In turn, idioms of mapping and exploring dark continents,orofbringingprogress and democracytoauthoritarian and decadent dominant groups have functionedasalanguageshared between the projects of amodernizing patriarchyand of colonialism, which is why gender and the rescue of women can emerge effortlesslyatt he heart of the languageofwestern interventions in the Middle East,and more generallyinwhat is now termed the global south. Each of the binariesb etween order and disorder, Enlightenment and darkness, subject and object has been realized as projects:of doctors,m issionaries, colonial administrators,s cholars and artists.
As colonial projects,they create what Fabian described as 'temporal distancing' between the time of the enquiringo bserver and that of the object of study (Fabian 1983, 61 ). This distance is itself internallyh ierarchized. So while India was distanceda sasociety run entirelyo np rinciples thatw eren ot simplyr eligious but fatalisticand irrational, Hinduism and Islam wereafforded recognition as 'religions'.B yc ontrast,t he anthropologist workingi nr ural villages encounters phenomenat hat have never made the grade as 'religion' since they fit into the most distantzone reserved by modernity for extreme superstition. European categories such as magic, witchcraft and possession mayentail more than simple transpositions of European categories to other places.Some, such as the historian Kathleen Davis, would arguethat the 'idea of an irrational, violent,superstitious,feudal "Middle Ages"… came into being as and through colonialism.' (Davis2 015,7 0):
Colonisers could not have mapped and administered foreign lands and bodies as they did without the simultaneous process of imaginingtheir own 'Middle Ages'.Vice versa 'the Middle Ages' could not have been conceptualised as such, apartf romE uropeans' attempt to theorise their relations to the people over whose lands they would layclaim. This holds particularlyt rue for India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. … The linear narrative that the 'idea of the Middle Ages spread unevenlyb ut was generallya ccepted' by the time of the nineteenth century not onlyobscures the colonial history of the becoming medieval of the 'the Middle Ages'-which was also the condition of possibilityfor the 'denial of coevalness'-but it also quietlya ffirms the displacement of this history upon the 'Renaissance',o stensiblyb eforeE urope'sc olonial struggle. (Davis 2015,7 0. 71) 2P ostcolonial histories of India and religion as the limit case
The kinds of critiques Ih avea lluded to are able to produce cogent critiques of modernity'se xclusions. But how far do they allow us to produce an account of that which has been excluded?H eret he results are less than satisfactory,a lthough manyadherents of such critiques in the broader field of cultural studies would regard even the attempt to produce an account of the excluded 'Other' as almosta xiomaticallyr omantic and essentialist.S uch an undertaking would hardlybew orth the risk. Im ay still not have nampikkai/belief or direct anubhavam of possessing deities, but my book is in one sense an extended response to the potter'squestions. But how have postcolonial historians responded to such questions?W hile they may never have been questioned as directlyasIwas, religion has been addressed in some form by virtuallye very foundational membero ft he influential Subaltern Studies group of historians.R eligion recurs in theirw ork as that which, lying outside the framework of modernh istoriography, must be re-integrated into an account of Indian history.B ut the impulsei ssplit by apoliticized hermeneutics of suspicion. The politics of the group is described by Chakrabartya se merging from aseries of events and social movementsinIndia that 'made official nationalism sound hollow' (Chakrabarty 2002,6 ) . The task taken on by this group of historians was thereforeextraordinarilywide ranging. They sought to reconstruct the history of Indian modernity not onlyfrom adecolonizing perspective but also from a 'subaltern' non-elite perspective that would be critical even of anti-colonial nationalist paradigms.Nocritique can undermine all the assumptions of the discourse it inherits and it is not surprising to find that certain parts were left standing intact. What is significant is thati ti st he domaino fr eligion which proves to be the recurrent point of instability. Iwillbeable to referhere onlytoafew examples. In his landmark studyof peasant insurgency in the colonial period, ElementaryA spects of PeasantI nsurgency (1983), Guha follows the Italian revolutionary Marxist Gramsci in two central respects. On the one hand, we are treated to am ore imaginative readingo f peasant consciousness.O nt he other hand, that consciousness is described as 'rather hesitant,inchoate and disjointed perception'.Inthis inchoate state it cannot but continue to borrow and clothe itself in the receivedl anguageo ft he ruling class (Guha 1983, 28) . Such aconsciousness can onlygosofar,succeeding in describing 'empiricallys ome aspects of the peasant'sc onditions of existence', but 'falling far short of conceptualizing the structure of authority which made such conditions possible' (Guha 1983, 28) .
Idonot question the assertion thatsuch aknowledge is not present in peasant rebellions, or indeed in most subordinategroups -although it is doubtful as to whether any intellectual frameworkcould deliversuch full knowledge.What is more to the point here is that it is the religious consciousness of the peasant leader which is singled out as the 'inherited and uncriticallyabsorbed material of the ruling culture' (Guha 1983, 11) , causing an erosion of the radical potential of such rebellion. Religious consciousness marks the peasant leader as both am ember of as ubordinateg roup as wella sl esst han af ull subjecto fr evolution:
He is still committed to envisagingthe coming war on the Rajasthe project of awill independent of himself and his own roleinitasnomorethan instrumental. 'Kanoo and Seedu Manjee arenot fighting. The Thacoor [Master,God] himself will fight' stated the parwana in which the authors did not recognise even their own voice, but heardonlythat of God: 'This is the order of the Thacoor'. ( Guha 1983, 28) The implicit set of contrasts is between the inherited and the newlyg enerated; between the uncritically absorbed and the conscious systematic critique of the past; between attributing agency to others, and claiming it as entirelyo ne's own. In each case, religion is understood entirelyi nt he terms of the first set of terms.
My next example comes from Pandey'sc orpus of work. It is centrallyc oncerned with religion. His earlyw ork sought to show how communalism -the supposedi nability of different religious groups,p articularlyH indus and Muslims, to co-exist without violence -was in fact ac olonial discourse (Pandey 1990) . Subsequent work on the Partitiono fI ndia (Pandey 2002; P andey 2006) has been directed at nationalist assumptions in Indian historiographyt hat render Partition and subsequent communal violence either as acts of natural calamity,o ra sd iscretee pisodest hatc an never be integrated into the Indian story of nationhood. But the discourse he wishest oa bandon, and the one his meticulously historicizingt raining produces,b oth ultimatelyo verlap in certain key respects.The discourse he wishes to leave behind is one in which the 'culture and interests, inclinations and "passions" of religious community are already known from the start.They appear as frozen entities, which are deniedthe possibility of internal difference, political agency and change, even as they become objects of political manipulation and governmentality in an ew way' (Pandey 2006,1 83) . The contrasting politicized account of religious communities differs in one crucial respect: such 'frozenness' has been politically produced. Since the nineteenth century,r eligious communities have been taking over all other forms of difference, so that religious identity has become one of the main markers of difference. The result of this process is a 'freezingofcommunities' (Pandey 2006,185) . Both accounts give us apicture of religious communities as devoid of agential political change. In the first account this is the resulto fa ne ssentialist colonial understanding of India as areligious society.Inthe second case it is the resultofhistorical processes since the nineteenth century.Although Pandey concedes that thingsweredifferent in the past,heparts companyw ith Nandyw ho, as we have noted, regards religious communities as stillable to generate adifferent form of cooperation to that posited by secularism. ForP andey on the other hand, these are politicized communities.The onlyagencyhenow sees left in religious communities is of adecidedlynegative kind, as objects of governmentality.Inthe process it is not onlynationalism thatstands indicted of having lost its 'imaginative moment' (Pandey 2006,182) . It is religion as well.
The work of Chakrabarty differsfrom the others in acrucial respect.Tracking the response of his peers towards religion, much as Ih ave, he concludes that Marxist traditions that seek to 'de-mystify ideologyinorder to produce acritique that looks forward to amorejust social order' are inadequate for understanding India as well as more generallya samethod.I nstead, it is equallyi mportant to represent non-European 'normative and theoretical thought enshrinedi no ther existing life practices and their archives' (Chakrabarty 2000,2 0) . European cat-egoriesare indispensable, he acknowledges, but one needs to 'release into their space' what might be learned through 'close and careful attention to languages, practices,a nd intellectual traditions present in South Asia' (Chakrabarty 2000, 20) . He turns for inspiration to the hermeneutictradition that 'produces aloving grasp of detail in search of an understanding of the diversityo fh uman lifeworlds' (Chakrabarty 2000,18) .
'Hermeneutical loving grasp of detail',the 'understanding of diversity of life worlds',t he 'careful attention to languagea nd practice':a ll these descriptions belong as much to anthropology as they do to the phenomenological traditions. If these phrases describe the domain of phenomenologyw ithin the traditions of philosophy, then they describea nthropology'sp roject in the domain of the empirical disciplines. Thisi sn oc oincidence. Ih avea rgued elsewheref or the substantial overlap between the two (Ram2013,2015). The phenomenological principle of describing alife world before moving on tooquicklytoproducing amore abstract account of it -let alone one thatbegins with the presumption of critique -is one that is shared with central aspects of anthropology. Chakrabarty'sc onclusion has been resoundingly prefiguredi nforthright statements by anthropologists such as Sahlins, who finds in 'different culturalorders their own modes of historical action, consciousness, and determination -their own historicalp ractice' (Sahlins 1983, 518 ).
3T he cleaving of time and place: canw ep ut
Humpty Dumpty together again?
We have come full circle in the argument.Apostcolonial or de-colonizingc ritique of anthropology instructed anthropologists to turn to history in order to integrate time into its account.H istorians similarlym oved by de-colonizingi mpulsesf ound history to be basedo na' singular historicalc onsciousness, which is that of modern,p rofessional, Western, or now global historicity' (Ballard 2014,1 02). Postcolonial critique helpedt ol ocate the reasons whyr eligion suffersf rom interpretationst hat basedt hemselveso ns uch am odernh istorical consciousness.However,the politics of critique has itself been too reliant on certain categorieso fm odernity to be able to accord anyp ositive capacity for conscious critical changewithin religious consciousness and religious communities. Historians troubled by this have called for ah ermeneutical phenomenology which, particularlyw herei te ntails involvement with non-European languages and practices,i sv irtuallyadescription also of anthropology.
We are in effect witnessinganoscillation between adiscourse that concerns itself with time and ad iscourse that concerns itself with place. The absences in each, taken together, point to adeeper underlying problem which is the artificial cleaving of time and place. The problem of the colonial politics of knowledge does not lie within one discipline. It is rather located in the division of labor in which bothhistory and anthropology participated. By the late nineteenth century,time and place became the subject matter of twodifferent disciplines. Both discipliness hared an orientation towardsacritique of universalism. In this sense, yetanother disciplinary demarcation wastaking place, one which separated the relativizing disciplines of history and anthropologyf rom philosophy. Henceforth, the universalisms of philosophyw ould be subject to relativizingcritique basede ither on historicity or the particularities of place. Both are to some extent impoverished by this divisiono fl abor,a si ndeed is the bifurcation between utter relativism and aprematureuniversalism. Thus if anthropology is interpreted exclusivelyasarelativizing discipline, then it does indeed encouragea tendencytocontinuallypresuppose and separate the west and the rest.Once the domains are separated in this manner,t he best we can arguef or is an ethical attitude of respect and tolerance for alterity and of critical reflection on one's own differencesf rom the 'Other'.
One of the reasons it is possiblefor both ahistorian and an anthropologist to turn to phenomenologya tt his point is because it offers aw ay of recapturing what phenomenologyw ould describea samore 'primordial' unity of time and place. Phenomenologya lsoo rients us to recognizingc ontinuities of experience -neither identityn or the polarized 'us' and 'them' of relativism. Temporalityi s no more the prerogative of one discipline than place is aprerogative of another. Rather,b oth time and place are embedded and embodied in the synthesisw e createt hrough our practical involvement with wider ecologies that entail the non-human environment as much as the human. These ecologies constitute places in their concreteness,unlike the abstractions of space derivedfrom geometry and science (Casey 1996) . But such syntheses are themselvest emporal. This is true both across generations and in the course of an individual'slifetime. We inherit ecologies, we are born into them, and these ecologies we inherit are nothing other than the syntheses alreadyeffected by previous generations, bequeathed to us both as material culture and the practicest hat enable us to inhabit that material culture. There is also temporality in the synthesisw ee ach of us effect in our embodied activitieso veralifetime, making it uniquelyi ndividual as well as part of at radition.
In this sense, temporalities are as varied as our activities and practices.The time of music making is as distinctive as the time of gardeningo ro fw riting a paper.And these rhythms will vary accordingtothe degree to which we have per-formedt hat synthesis between body, tasks and environment -the rhythm of a skilled musician is very different to that of an ovice, the rhythm of the final draft of apaper is very different to the awkwardness that afflicts every fresh beginning.
What does this mean for the scholarofreligion?How does one gain access to syntheseso ne is not born into nor has acquired by adulthood?T he question is one If aced in relation to spirit possession. But let us note that the wayw e have posed this question alreadym oves us away from the domain of asking whether we have to believea nd consent to the beliefs of others. Is till do not have nampikkai or belief in the sense that the potter spoke of. But understanding is something that can proceed without necessarilyentailing belief and in fact can happen even without choosing to do so. Agreement,f aith and belief maycount for less ultimatelyinthe relationship between the non-religious scholar and the worshipper,than for the scholartoarrive at aslow incorporative mode of understanding which is born of the other dimension the potter questioned me about, namely anubhavam,experience. Even if Ihaven ot had the direct anubhavam of the goddess -although Ia mn ot sure even of thata ny longer -Ih avec ertainly had direct experience of manyothers who have.A nd some elements of this understandingpass over into one'sown embodied activities. Over aperiod of time, Ik new which parts of the village held ghosts,w hich routes weres horterb ut meant passinga no ld temple of the fiery goddess. Guided initiallyb yt he fear and circumspection of my companions,b yt he end Id id not need others to guide me -my feet would steer me away from there. To recover and value the full potential of anthropological practice requires moving away from the model of knowledge thati sd escribed as objectivism by phenomenologists, and which has prevailedw ithin anthropologya sw ell as history.Writing of anthropology from an existential phenomenological perspective,J ackson listst he legacies of this tendency:
Subjectivity was conflated with roles, rules,routines….And just as the natural sciences created the appearance of objectivity through specialized, analytical language, so the social sciences cultivated an image of objectivity by reducingpersonstofunctions and identities: individuals filled roles, fulfilled obligations,followed rules,performed rituals and internalized beliefs. (Jackson 2013,3 ) The chargestake us back to the critique of overlystatic account,though Jackson is less concerned with historical time and more with existential time in all its eddies and flux. On the other hand, the same discipline that can objectify knowledge also provides us with the wherewithal for quite ad ifferent conception of what it is to know something.A nd the same phenomenologyt hatc an be used to locate omissions in anthropology can alsob eu sedt oi nstead 'uncover',o r 'disclose' as Heideggerwould put it,avery different understanding that already exists in anthropology of what it is to understand something initiallyf oreign to oneself. That understanding lies not so much in the strictly hermeneuticalm oment of trying to interpret another culturea sif it werea na lient ext (Bourdieu's trenchant critique of this model remains unsurpassed, Bourdieu 1977) , but rather in the practice of living with others over aprolongedperiod of time. Thisisalsoa processt hat creates shared time,n ot just in terms of largere vents that the anthropologistp articipates in along with others, but in the shared time of doing everydayt hingst ogether. Buried under the rather prosaic and naturalistic title of 'field work' is at horoughlyp henomenological understanding of 'being' as 'being-with'.T his is one of Heidegger'sc entral theses in Being and Time,s uch that 'Even Dasein'sB eing-alone is Being-with in the world (Heidegger1 962, (156) (157) . This understanding exists in ap ractical form in anthropology. But it might be strengthened by the explicit framework supplied by aphilosophical alternative to al ong standing epistemologicalt radition, such as we encounter in Heidegger'sopeninginBeing and Time or in Merleau-Ponty'sradical integration of bodily activity and sensory perception into philosophiesofsubjectivity in Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty 1986) .
Forinrelation to field work we stand at what Foucault describes as the cusp of ad iscourse that has just ceased to be ours. It is preciselyt he temporality of research, as long term engagement and involvement in the liveso fo thers, which is being rapidlyw hittled away,c ertainlyi nA ustralia, by the rise of the market model within university researchf unding.W ea re speaking here of the mere three and ah alf years allotted for Ph.D.s in Australia, allowing no time even for acquiring language. Being on such ac usp affords the opportunityt o make explicit what has often remained implicit.O ft he manyd imensions one could discuss,Ifocus on the one involving change. Reformulations of fieldwork as 'inter-subjective' constructions obscureanumber of aspectsofthe interaction. Ih avee laboratedo nt his elsewherei nt erms of the need for ac oncept like the 'habitus',which indicates that thereisalreadyahistory flowing into the present moment of inter-subjectivity (Ram 2015,4 1 -42) . Fort he very same reason the changet hat occurs in the interactions of field work is not equallyd istributed -it is far more radical for the researcher than for those around her.S he is there without the supports of her wider social and physical ecology (another wayo fd escribing the habitus) while others continue to enjoy those supports. It is she who must adapt -or suffer further isolation,a nd the more radical the differenceb etween her current situation and her past,t he more she must changea nd adapt to the subjectivity of others.
Ethnographygives us manyinstances of such alterations, although giventhe centralityofthe process for anthropology,there should be alot more. In apiece publishedi n1 990,H astrupd escribes her experience of field work in Iceland as involving months of 'loneliness,ofsexual assaults,loss of identity,and offensive enemys pirits'-yeto ne of her greatest shocks was, 'to be reminded about her own world' (Hastrup 1990,4 6) . At the end of ay ear,s he receivesl etters addressed to an academic called Kirsten Hastrups he no longer recognizes. While she acknowledgest hat thati sj ust what she had to return to, she nevertheless insists on the radical nature of field work which 'implies that the well-established opposition between subjecta nd object dissolves' (Hastrup 1990,46) .
My own experience of field work in afishing community on the west coast of Kanyakumari was much happier.Ispoke the language, though Idiscovered that what It hought of as an undifferentiated Tamil was in fact markedb ym yc aste background as well as the particular parts of Tamil country my parents came from. Il ived with an affectionate family, with whom Id evelopedd eep bonds and through them, with their relativesinthe village as well. But an earlyintimation of the changes Ih ad undergone came after Ih ad been living in the fishing community for nearlyayear.AyoungN ordic couple pulled up in their sailing craft in the neighboring largerp ort town of Colachel. My companions,s ome younger than myself, werev ery curious and Iwent along with them. Ifound myself pushed to the foreground to act as an intermediary,atwhich point Idiscovered Iw as goggling at the visitors like anyv illager -as 'white' people, utterly exotic and alien -as if friends and my own husband backi nA ustralia were not 'white' and 'western'.Ifelt nothing like an intermediary,a lthough If orced myself to chat and translate for the benefit of others.
Af ew years later it happened again. Thist ime Ih ad come back to catch up with my adoptive family.A tt he time If elt they werec loser to me thanm yo wn familyi nI ndia, and Iwas very emotional about seeing them again in their new home near Chennai.Iwas with youngteenagers Sheela and Babu -their mother had shooed us out for the days os he could prepareaspecial dinner for my return -and we were at the seashore town of Mahabalipuram, whose splendid Pallava dynasty rock carvingsmake it anotable tourist attraction. SuddenlySheela averted her eyes, abashed by something she had seen. When Ie nquired, she pointed to tourists who were, in her eyes, wearingnext to nothing.Ifound myself invaded by as hared sense of embarrassment and indignation at white tourists with no sense of propriety.M yS ydney self, utterlyu sed to the beaches and beachwear,h ad disappeared.
Such responses point to ap ermeability,aporosity in us, which meanst he 'social' in social science succeedsi nr adicallyr e-defining what it means to be ascience at all. This does not mean we have 'gone native',asthe colonial phrase had it.The shared identityIfelt at these moments might easilybereplaced by a sense of being quite alien in another context.I ndeed, how else can we explain the fact that 'possession'-preciselyt he quintessential situation wheres ubject and object completelyc ollapse into one -remained ap rovocation for me for so manyyears. Yetitisworth emphasizing these moments wherethe subject/object dichotomydissolves, however temporarily, since they are easilyobscured by intellectualist theories of knowledge.Amethod which integrates mitsein as a central feature allows for modes of understanding that are not simplyamatter of cognitive comprehensiono fi nitiallyu nfamiliar categories employed by others. We movem agically, as it were, into adopting the gesturesa nd orientations of the social group we are with. Such magic is not merelyamatter of 'performance' in the conventional sense since there is abodilymovement into the situation of others. Nor is it amatter of empathysince it entails aslow alteration and changeo nt he part of the researcher to the point wheres he can movei nto the stance and orientation required by those she is with at the time.
Herew em ight connect the longue duree of changei nt he researcher herself to the distinctiond rawn by phenomenologists between knowing about something and understanding something.The formerp reserves ar adical distinction between the enquiring subjecta nd the object of enquiry. 'Understanding',i n contrast,p resupposes ap eriod of bodily involvement and familiarization on the part of the ethnographer.Wemight then call this formoftemporality the embodied time it takesfor amodicum of human re-socialization to take place. Such re-socialization is not confined to the time spent 'in the field'-it carries over into the practices of sustained writing,teaching, readingand ongoingreflection; all of which are part of anthropological practice. In my book Icall the work done by the spirit mediumaprocess of 'makingr oom' for the alien spirit.What the ethnographer performs over alifetime is not so different.But the sign of absorbing and 'understanding' ap henomenon, even ar adicallya lien experience such as spirit possession, lies not in being able to sayone now 'believes' in it -aquestion my students frequentlya sk me. Rather it lies in being able to place one's own experienceso nac ontinuum with that which initiallys eemed utterly alien. In my book Iw rite about the manyi ntermediary states we all inhabit from time to time, states in which it is hardly appropriatet od escribe ourselves as asubject facing an entirely external object.We 'lose ourselves' in creativity,in writing,making music but also in thosequotidian moments of flow such as driving along aw ell-known route. In bothc ases, if we are asked to formallys tate how we 'gotthere',wewould be at aloss.Inall these cases, the loss of self-consciousnessisnot the opposite of agency, it is the very essence of acertain kind of agency.
These are not just analogies with possession. They are located on ac ontinuumo fe xperiencest hat are not simply stateso fc onsciousness, since they radicallyi nvolve bodilys kills, aptitudes and orientations.M oreover we could be propelled at anyp oint to al esser or more extreme end of that continuum -in extreme states of lovea nd grief, for instance.T he ancient Greeks thought of lovea saform of possession by the deity Aphrodite. Death too can generate a state wherep ossession can seem am ore aptd escription than many others. At the time when Ia mw riting this paper,m yh usband has just died, onlyafew months ago. He died very reluctantlya nd sadly, since his whole being was burgeoning with fresh and potential projects for new novels, essays,writings of all kinds, as well as his lovefor his wife, daughter and friends. He died keenlyaware that his skills as anovelistwerenow honed to afine craft,and at the peak of the powers he valued the most.Ih avel earned that there is injusticen ot onlyi na ' bad death' such as the ones that led to possession, there is al ingering sense of injusticei nd eaths such as his. Perhaps there is as ense of injusticei na ll death insofar as it extinguishest he potentiality we all carry with us to varying degrees right until the moment of death.
Ir ealizet hata ll such unspent potential has the potential to haunt and to possess the living who are closelyi ntertwined with the dead. In the time immediatelyf ollowing his death, If ound myself attending the plays and films he would have attended, readingpoetry hewould have read. SuddenlyIslam, something he spent al ifetime reflecting on since his period in Pakistan as av ery young man, meant agood deal to me as well in anew way. Iwroteanew lecture on Islam in South Asia, following the footprintsh eh ad left in the sand into his library.I thas been much more than away of feeling close to him, although that is part of it.His tastes and preoccupations werecomingthrough as urgent needs on my part.Nodoubtthe ground for shared tastes had been laid slowlyfor both of us over thirty five years together.B ut it was now happeningi naparticularly dramatic and urgent fashion. What is equallynotable is that it has also simultaneously been an expansion of my agency -not in the sense of an expansion of deliberate choices,for Iexperienced it as simplybeing drawntohis kind of films, books, and plays.I tisanexpansion in the sense that it is adilation of my older self and new experiences and tastes are being born out of the experience.Asitis with Tamil villagers, such experience opens up more than just an experience of the dead -the actions they prompt lead in turn to an expandedrangeo fp ossibilities for the living,a sw ella sacurtailment of others.
My arguments about possession and agency are no longer an ethnographic argument.T hey are no longer ad escription of something outside myself. They have become integrated into my own experience,m yanubhavam,o fl ife and death. And out of that integration can come new possibilities -of reflecting back more deeplyo nt he existential truths in the widespread tendencyf ound in cultures around the world to link violent death with possession. Equally,
